Context
The tides of delegate compensation have shifted significantly in the two-plus years since I wrote my original post on delegate rewards. That’s expected. Crypto moves fast, and it would be naive to assume governance—or compensation models—would stay static.
This note is intentionally unfinished. It reflects where my thinking is right now, and I expect it to change as DAOs mature, experiments succeed or fail, and new governance patterns emerge.
What’s Actually Improved
One positive trend: many large and small DAOs alike have gravitated toward simpler delegate compensation systems.
The focus has largely been on rewarding the behaviors that matter most:
-
Voting
-
Posting rationales
-
Engaging in forum discussion and debate
This is directionally correct. These activities are foundational to governance legitimacy and decision-making.
When “Simple” Became Too Complicated
Arbitrum is a notable exception.
What started as a simple system evolved into a highly complex structure:
-
A third party overseeing delegate compensation (this is standard)
-
A project manager role (this is also standard)
-
A highly subjective rubric for evaluating the quality of forum participation, leading to many regular disputes from delegates (this is where it got messy)
-
Many versions of the program, with steadily declining compensation
The lengthy experiment failed. And that’s okay — failure is part of governance design.
Arbitrum has since signaled a shift toward simplifying voting rewards again in 2026, while exploring a new incentive program for contributors. Details are still TBD and will likely surface on the forum.
A recurring pattern in Arbitrum governance is swinging between extremes:
-
Highly gated processes controlled by specific actors Â
-
Or fully open forums with endless debate and unclear outcomes Â
That tension is very much part of Arbitrum’s culture.
The Elephant in the Room: Who Gets Paid
Here’s where this gets uncomfortable.
Delegates are often told they should work for free — while foundation and labs employees earn very high salaries. In some cases, just under six figures.
Many of the loudest voices against delegate compensation are:
-
Employed by well-funded companies
-
Paid salaries for DAO-adjacent work
-
Financially insulated from the need for delegate rewards
For some delegates, that model works.
But the idea that delegates across the board should not be compensated for real labor that moves protocols forward is condescending — especially when the same ecosystem pays others extremely well for adjacent work.
Delegates are expected to contribute time, expertise, judgment, and reputation — and then told the work isn’t “real enough” to merit compensation.
That disconnect is a governance failure.
A Deeper Structural Problem
Part of the issue is perception.
Delegates often do work that others later decide “wasn’t important.” Without alignment or explicit support from foundations or core teams, DAOs are left to self-organize — only to have that work minimized, re-scoped, or defunded later.
Delegates end up defining their own roles reactively, then hearing:
-
“This isn’t the right work”
-
“This shouldn’t exist”
-
“You’re being paid too much”
That’s not sustainable.
The Emergence of Professional Delegates
A new class of delegates is forming: professional delegates.
You’ll recognize them by their behavior:
-
Consistent, high-signal forum participation
-
Deep feedback on proposals
-
Long-term thinking about protocol health
-
Willingness to say hard things early
The goal isn’t power — it’s continuity, safety, and growth.
This work is often thankless unless a foundation or labs team is genuinely committed to making governance succeed.
Where It’s Working Better
Some DAOs are getting this right.
From my experience, Scroll and Rootstock stand out for being intentional about the delegate experience:
-
Clear expectations
-
Organizational structure
-
Defined roles and responsibilities
-
Accountability metrics
Yes — organizational structure matters.
Staking as Alignment Infrastructure
Staking is becoming a core governance primitive.
In Rootstock, staking is required for governance participation.
Scroll is moving in a similar direction:
-
Governance participation aligned with verified delegates
-
Delegates help meet quorum and support ecosystem growth
-
Technical proposals handled via optimistic approval, not delegate voting
This separation of responsibilities is healthy.
The Question That Matters Most
How are decisions actually made?
This question should be answered at the outset of any DAO.
Councils help. Â
Working groups help. Â
Clear scopes help.
Governance doesn’t fail because people don’t care — it fails because responsibility, authority, and incentives are misaligned.
And that, more than anything, is what delegate compensation debates are really about.
I want this to go into my digital garden because it’s evolving.
The tides of delegate comp have shifted a ton in the two+ years since I write the original post on delegate rewards. Which makes sense, right, crypto moves super fast, and it would be dumb to think that delegate comp wouldn’t evolve and change too.
Some good things: big DAOs and small DAOs alike, for the most part, focused on keeping delegate comp simple, rewarding the behaviors that delegates should be focused on. Which is voting, posting rationales, and commenting on the forum to debate and discuss proposals.
In the unique case of Arbitrum, this simple system went super complicated with a party overseeing it, a project manager, which is totally fine, everywhere project mamnager, but they were very subjective and decided what forum replies were good and not, using a detailed rubric.
The experiment failed, but that’s okay. Arbitrum is since evolving their system in 2026 to simplify rewards for voting, and creating new types of rewards for contributions. This is still tbd and will be on the forum. Maybe problem with Arbitrum is it goes from one extreme to another: every decision is either gated by certain parties (AAEs) or completely out in the open on the forum with endless debates. Tis the Arbitrum culture.
Back to what’s good - ha, this is hard now to think about after I saw salaries of Foundation employees, all just under a mil. WTF, and from someone who was against delegate comp…
Delegates get scraps. Are expected to work for free by people who are making a lot of money and saying there’s no need for delegate rewards. For some delegates, maybe, who work for a company that is providing a service, that get paid a salary, who are making a lot of money, and don’t need rewards to sustain themselves, it makes sense to not pay them.
But thinking that delegates across the board shoudl not be getting compensation for doing work that helps move the protocol forward or that helps it grow, is condescending an insulting. Especially when those peopel are getting paid bookoo money for working.
The root issue may be that delegates are doing work that others perceive is not important. Without support from The Foundation or Labs team, key stakeholders, the DAO is left to figure it out for themselves and create work that gets minimized later.
As the space evolves, and delegate rewards evolves with it, I am expecting to see more clear guidance and a playbook, if you will, for what activities are meaningful and what DAOs should be doing. Already, the key things are delegates should be hosting events, attending events, talking to builders, providing feedback, creating proposals that grow the protocol.
I’ve noticed the issue is that delegates have been defining their own roles and responsibilities, only for The foundation later to say no this is not right or no this shouldn’t be this way, we are cutting it, or we are payign you too much money.
There’s a class of delegates forming called professional delegates. You’ll see us in the forums providing a lot of feedback and heavily contributing to the conversation. Our goal is to make sure the protocol moves forward and the DAO is continuing to grow it, in a safe and steady way. Our work is often thankless, unless a foundation or labs team is really committed to makign it work.
Okay, enough complaining. A few DAOs like Scroll and rootstock, these are just the ones where i am a delegate, they are really focuesd on the delegate experience. They see the value in this grassroots system, where delegats have clear expectations and there is an organizational structure.
Yes, an organizational structure, with clear roles and responsibilities defined from the outset, with accountability metrics.
Staking is a core part of this. Rootstock has staking, imperative for participating in governance. Scroll also will implement staking, which is meant to align governance participation with verified delegates, who help meet quorum, and also help the protocol to grow. But verified delegates won’t vote on technical proposals. Technical proposals will be optimistically approved.
How will decisions be made? This is the question we need to address at the onset of any DAO. Councils are good. Working groups are good.